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INTRODUCTION

Covenants to not compete or non-compete agreements ("NCA") are formal
contractual agreements between employers and employees relating to restrictions
on employees' post-employment activities. Although there is limited empirical
research on the use of non-competes,' said covenants are not a new phenomenon
and they are increasingly used by employers to restrict an employee's ability to
work for a competitor, start a competing business and, in some cases, to protect
valuable information such as trade secrets. NCAs may also deal with restraining
the employee from competing with the business after it is sold and/or from
soliciting clients of the former employer.2 These contractual terms, often signed as
a condition of employment, could be embedded in the employment contract or
written as a stand-alone agreement.3

* Professor of Law at the Shepard Broad College of Law of Nova Southeastern University, where she
teaches the Business, International, Comparative and Commercial Courses. I would like to thank
my research assistants, Ms. Paige Applebaum for editing the footnotes, Ms. Mariah Schiff for her
research.
1 Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete,
Trends, and Implications for Employee Mobility Policy, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 751, 783 (2011) (States that a
statistical data on the actual number of non-competes in specific jurisdictions and industries are
missing a piece of non-compete research, given this information is hard to obtain because these
non-competes are generally not publicly reported or catalogued).
2Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: BalancingInnovationfrom Employee
Mobility Against Legal Protectionfor Human CapitalInvestment, 27 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 294
(2006).

3 Id.
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On the one hand, these non-compete agreements are beneficial to
companies. They protect human capital, intellectual property, interfere relations
and could increase productivity as companies would be more willing to invest in
training workers and developing new products and processes, if confident of being
able to reap the benefits of this investment.4 Indeed, traditional economic theory
finds post-employment restrictions are relevant and necessary in constricting the
movement of human capital, as it assumes that, without such contractual
restrictions, employers would "underinvest in research, development and
employee training," as there is a higher risk that such employees would leave and
use these acquired attributes as competitors.'
However, on the other hand, the enforcement of non-compete agreements
may have negative effects, as it may hinder innovation, economic growth and
entrepreneurships. 6 Kenneth Arrow argues that competition is what fuels
innovation, and, with reference to human capital, "mobility of personnel among
firms provides a way of spreading information."' He believes such information
travels with workers between companies thereby resulting in even more
knowledge and consequently strengthening competition.' Professor Hyde, a
strong advocate for labor mobility, under a conducive legal structure that, among
other things, disallows non-compete agreements, has argued in favor of the
California approach, which essentially bans NCAs, as the state's laws have enabled
a "high velocity" labor market where employees move quickly between jobs or
simply remain independent contractors. "Thus, technical information and
innovation are shared quickly, without restrictions and are "porous to outside
influence." Hence the success of Silicon Valley.'
Although non-compete agreements were originally considered
unenforceable because they were said to be in restraint of trade, a majority of states'
policies allow some degree of enforcement. Virtually all state courts today
employing one of three rules to determine enforceability: (1) the all or nothing
approach; (2) the blue pencil approach, and; (3) the judicial modification standard
approach, which could enforce, revise or strike out the non-compete agreement. 0
However, the states treat the enforcement of these covenants differently, thereby
making it complex to even discern a standard form language in the different
jurisdictions." California statutes, for example, restrict courts to enforcing noncompete clauses in very limited circumstances, with the California Business
4 Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, NoncompetcCovenants:Incentivesto Innovatc or Impediments to Growth,
57 Mgmt. Sci. 425, 425-26 (2011).
On Armir & Orly Lobel, DrivingPerformance:A Growth Theory ofNoncompetcLaw, 16 Stan. Tech. L. Rev.
833, 837 (2013).
6 Samila & Sorenson, supranote 4, at 425-26.
7
Armir & Lobel, supra note 5, at 846.

8

Id, at 837.

9 Bishara,

supranote 2, at 308.
See Clark's Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Smith, 4 N. E.3d 772, 783-87 (Ind Ct. App. 2014) (Where court
struck down a provision in its entirety because it was patently unreasonable).
11 Sye T. Hickey, To Compete or Not to Compete: Is that the 2uestion?, 21 Bus. TORTS & UNFAIR
COMPETITION 18, 22 (2014).
10
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Professions Code stating that "every contract by which anyone is restrained from
engaging in a lawful possession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent
void." 2 In Texas is liberal in its enforcement of non-compete clauses through the
Texas Business & Commerce Code section 15.50 (a)." Guy Carpenter d& Co. v
ProvenZale 4 provides that a covenant not to compete is enforceable if it is "ancillary
to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement at the time the agreement is made
to the extent that it contains limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of
activity to be restrained that are reasonable."" Some state courts take a
"reformation" or "blue pencil" approach and will rewrite unreasonable or
impermissible clauses. 6 Florida exemplifies such a case, as Fla. Stat. S 542. 335 (1)
(c) provides that courts "modify the restraint and grant only the relief reasonably
necessary to protect [legitimate] business interests." 7
Regardless of which side of the debate one stands, a fundamental issue to
handle is how the law of non-compete agreements should be dealt with in a
changing landscape of the labor market. How should state policy makers construe
these employment relationships in evaluating non-compete agreements in an
evolving market? What are the public policy implications of allowing or restricting
non-compete agreements? For example, with the explosion and evolution of
technology come many complex issues relating to non-compete agreements. With
some companies providing products or services exclusively on the internet or
offering an online platform for their customer services, there are complex
challenges in interpreting non-compete agreements based on physically
measurable terms like duration and geographic scope and location."
This article will thus evaluate non-compete covenants and their impact on
businesses and entrepreneurship as a whole within the changing labor market and
their influence in fostering or impeding growth of firms; it will examine the Law
and Economic approach to non-compete covenants to identify what may be most
efficient for the employer/employee in light of mobility, human capital, spillovers
and other emerging factors in an increasingly technology focused world.
My analysis will be bolstered by two case studies: considering the
undisputed economic success of Silicon Valley, I will examine the California model
and approach to NCAs, with the goal of determining if it constitutes a policy
approach that could be replicated in other states. If so, examine why this has not
been widely done aside from an unsuccessful attempt in Massachusetts. I will also
examine the case of Ohio, which applies a two-pronged test to determine whether
NCAs are reasonable and perceived to be strictly against employees. The pertinent
question for Ohio is the effect that evolving technology may have on determining

12 CAL. Bus. & PROF CODE § 16601.
13

TEX. Bus.

14

Guy Carpenter & Co., Inc. v. Povenzale, 334 F. 3d 459, 464-65 (5th Cir. 2003).

& COM. § 15.50 (2001).

15 Hickey, supra note 11, at 19.
16

Id
Id. at 19
18 Adam V. Buente, Enforceability of Noncompetc Agreements in the Buckeyc State: How and Why Ohio Courts
Apply thcReasonablenessStandardto Entrepreneurs,8 OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. Bus. L. J. 73, 93 (2013).
1

94

University of Puerto Rico Business Law Journal

reasonableness, which is the focus of non-compete litigation, again, determine if it
would be desirable to replicate or abandon this approach.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

To NCA AND THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR

ALLOWING OR RESTRICTING NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS

The law of non-compete and restrictive covenant in the United Sates
originated from the English common law, prevalent in England since the 17 th
century." Historically, CNC in the employment context has been an issue of
contention both under the English common law and as applied in the American
law. These agreements were considered to be in restraint of trade and freedom of
contracts and therefore void.20 This hostility towards CNC is compounded by the
fact that the CNC are contracts of adhesions, whereby the parties have unequal
bargaining power as well as one party having no choice in its terms.2' Although
traditionally, courts frowned on agreements not to compete, with such agreements
actually proscribed under the early common law, this rule has been watered down,
as the courts believe that the NCA can be effective and yet serve other interests
besides free trade.22 Consequently, NCA subject to an employment contract are
permissible based upon the agreement meeting the reasonableness test.23 Under
this common law test, the court tries to balance the conflicting interests of the
employer, employee and the society. That is, the employer has an interest to protect
the use of its business assets via misappropriation by a former employee, and in the
same vein, an employee has a similar interest in ensuring its marketability and
mobility.24 The society on the other hand, has an interest in promoting a free and
fair competition that invariably foster innovation and new endeavors in the market
place.25 Thus, in balancing these interests, the common law permits employee NCA
agreements but simultaneously put limits on the restrictive covenants, in that way,
ensures that it is not too arduous to the employee nor harmful to the market
place.26
So if the employer demonstrates that a legitimate interest will be served by
an agreement not to compete, the terms of the non-compete agreement will be
scrutinized to make sure it is not burdensome or too extensive to serve that
interest.2 7 The factors the courts would consider in examining the NCA for
reasonableness includes the time period restriction, the geographic scope, the
breadth of the restriction post-employment and the effect of the restriction on the
Benjamin I Fink, Is strict Enforcement of Non-Competes Good Policy?, https://www.bfvlaw.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/2017-TS-Summit-article-re -non-compete-policy-00891624.pdf
(last
visited April 12, 2019).
19

20Id.
21
22

Id. scc also Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 188 (1981).
Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompetc Agreements: Recent

Trends and an Alternative PolicyApproach, 45 AM. Bus. L. J. 107,114 (2008).
23

d.

Id. at 115.
25 Id. at 115. (The added public interest is also in discouraging employers from limiting the
exploitation of the market by the use of their superior bargaining power).
26 Id.
27Id at 117.
24
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employee, as well as the effect it may have on competition in the market.2 8 For
example, a court would be reluctant to honor a NCA that prevents the employee
from working for a competitor or enters into a business that does not directly affect
the business of the former employer. The case of Kapinsky v. Ingrasci exemplifies this
principle. 29 In that case, the New York Court of Appeals readily recognized and
upheld an NCA that would deny an oral surgeon from practicing oral surgery
within a certain radius of New York. However, the court did not uphold the part
of the NCA that denied the oral surgeon the ability to practice dentistry, as that
practice was not in direct competition with the ex-employer's business.30
A. GENERAL CURRENT TREND OF NON-COMPETES IN THE UNITED STATES
Today, although these post-employment restraint agreements have been
greatly debated and litigated by the legislature and courts, there is no consistent
comprehensive uniform policy applicable across the states as to what factors
would be sufficient to support the employer's claim. To the contrary, the
enforcement of NCA is still evolving and unpredictable, just as with related
broader issues in employment and contract law."' Although most states employ the
reasonableness test in evaluating the enforceability of NCA as discussed above, the
approach, tools and principles employed by the courts vary from court to court.
This also would mean that what one court may consider a reasonable constraint
on employee's activities might not necessarily be the same standard employed in
another court or jurisdiction.32 In the same vein, a courts determination as to
whether to accept a non-compete by the court's use of contract modification or
reformation or the grant of partial enforcement would also vary and as exercised
by the court's discretions. 3 Consequently, gauging the strength of a non-compete
legal enforcement is complex and challenging as understanding enforcement or
enforceability should take into account state statutes and case law in the different
jurisdictions. 4 In spite of these challenges, Bishara and Starr carried out a survey
project in 2014. They noted the following on a spectrum of weak to strong
enforcement of non-competes:" 96 0/ of states-49 states and the District of
Columbia-permits some type of non-compete enforcement, with 12 states (20 0/)
strongly enforcing non-competes (such as Florida and New Mexico); 9 states 9
(180/) weakly enforce non-competes, such as Arkansas and Alaska, and 30 states
(600/) moderately enforcing non-compete. 6 It is important to state that:

Garrison & Wendt, supra note 22, at 123-24.
Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E. 2d 751, 754-55 (1971).
30 Garrison &Wendt, supra note 22, at 118.
31 Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforcement of Covenants not to Compete,
28
29

Trends, and ImplicationsforEmployccMobilityPolicy, 13 U. PA.J. Bus. L. 751,756 (2011).
32
Id. at 773
33

1JCL

Id.
Sec generally J.J. Prescott, Norman D. Bishara, Evan Starr, UnderstandingNoncompetition Agreements:
Thc2014 Non-Compete Survcy Project, 2016 M ICH. ST. L. REV. 369, 457-62 (2016).
36 See Fink, supra note 19, at 17.
34
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"

Non-compete agreements in the United States fall into two major
basic trends with some nuances and subtleties in the different
jurisdictions in between. First, those laws that find non-compete
agreement invalid -like in California and North Dakota- which
will not generally enforce a non-compete in the employment
context. As such, these two states occupy one end of the spectrum.
Second, those laws providing non-competes may be enforced if they
pass the reasonableness standard test.

"

Some states will not enforce non-competes except under limited circumstances.
For example, Colorado is more permissive of non-competes for executives and
management personnel. 8 Some states will only enforce non-compete against
someone who has willingly quits he job.
All states agree that there should be protection of a business interest, like
trade secrets, confidential information, but the states are not in unison as to what
those interests should be. 40 In Florida and in Kentucky, the protectable interests
include general skill training.4' Some states will rewrite unreasonably broad noncompete and yet, other states will simply refuse to enforce the agreement. 42 In
Oregon, the procedure and consideration required for enforcement of the noncompete, includes a requirement that the company inform the employee of the noncompete at least two weeks before the employee begins work.41 The employer's
failure to do so will result in more consideration for the modification.44
B. THE POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS

Although the non-compete issue is primarily a matter of state law, noncompete agreements caught the attention of the federal government as the interest
to reform non-compete were brought to the forefront especially in light of
oppressive non-competes for low wage employees.

45

This decision was made even

more eminent by the released Report of the US Department of Treasury's Economic
Policy titled Non-compete Contracts: Economic Effects and Policy Implications. It
concluded that non-competes are harmful to the broader economy. 4
3

7JI
Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 34, at 391.
39
Id. at 457.
40
d.
31

42

43
44
45

Id. at 458.
Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 36, at 458.

Id.

Id. at 393.; Sec also Senator Chris Murphey Franklin's bill to ban non-compete agreements for low
wage workers, New Competition for Non-Compete Agreements, FRANKLIN & PROKOPIC (June 3, 2015),
https://www.fandpnet.com/new-competition-for-non-compete-agreements/.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, NON-COMPETE CONTRACTS:
ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (The Treasury Department reported that although
46. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC POLICY,

employers use these non-competes for their benefits, such as to protect trade secrets, limit
employee turnover and more, but that these benefits also come at the expense of the workers and
the economy as whole.
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Consequently, then President Obama called upon Congress to act on the
"unnecessary" non-compete agreement in order to set aside non-compete
agreements for salary workers below a certain threshold, as well as implement best
practices for states that enforce these non-compete agreements.4" This
congressional interest led to the Proposed Mobility and Opportunity for
Vulnerable Employee Act of 2015 ("MOVE ACT"). The Act sought to ban
covenants not to compete for workers making less than $15 an hour.48 Advocates
for the bill believed that the low wage employees are stuck at the same low level
with no opportunity to rise to a higher job paying level because of these none
competes that employers force them to sign49 . In other words, because of these
agreements, there is no incentive for these low wage earners to seek better and
higher paying jobs and therefore they are wedded to these low paying jobs, holding
them in this vicious cycle of poverty. Therefore, the advocates believe that banning
the use of non-competes agreements, these workers may be encouraged to move
into better jobs and therefore a better life for them and their families.
As issues arise as to whether there is a policy of nationalizing non-compete
agreements, the fact remains that the "Call to Action" by the Treasury
Department's white paper and the Obama administration merely sought to
encourage state lawmakers to undertake non-compete regulation." 0 Because
employers are expected to continue to focus on state-level regulation of noncompete provisions, to talk of a national regulation of non-competes may be farfetched." Currently, the Trump administration does not appear to depart from this
general policy under the Obama administration.5 2 How long this would be for, only
time will tell.
The strict traditional approach to non-competes which was founded on
being highly protective of employee's right to mobility and promoting society's
41 See The White House Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: The Obama Administration
Announces New Steps to Spur Competition in the Labor Market andAcceleratc Wage Growth, OBAMA WHITE
HouSE
ARCHIVES
(Oct.
25,
2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepressoffice/2016/10/25/fact-sheet-obama-administration-announces -new -steps -spurcompetition.
4Id. Secalso Mobility and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees Act, S. 1504,114h Cong. (2015).
49 Prescott, Bishara & Starr supra note 34, at 393.; Sec also Senator Chris Murphey Franklin's bill to
ban non-compete agreements for low wage workers, New Competitionfor Non-Compete Agreements,
FRANKLIN & PROKOPIC (June 3, 2015), https://www.fandpnet.com/new-competition-for-noncompete-agreements/.
50 Sec Cody Lonning & Douglas Mishkin, Non-Competes Depart thcFederalScencin the New Administration,
TRADE
SECRETS
&
TRANSITIONS
(July
13,
2017),
https://www.tradesecretsandtransitions.com/2017/07/non-competes-depart-the-federal-scene-inthe-new-administration/.
11 This deference to states is exemplified by states laws like the Illinois Freedom to Work Act,
outlawing non-competes for low-wage employees, and Utah's Post-Employment Restrictions Act,
limiting non-competes to one year.
52 Laura Dyrda, Trump AdministrationAsks States to Scrutinize Non-Competc Clausesfor Physicians, (Dec. 07,
2018)
https://www.beckersasc.com/ase-turnarounds-ideas-to-improve-performance/trumpadministration-asks-states-to-scrutinize-non-compete-clauses-for-physicians.html

BECKER'S ASC

(last visited April 12, 2019). ("The recent Trump administration proposed recommendations and
changes to the healthcare system includes non-compete clauses. The proposal recommends that
states "scrutinize non-compete agreements and restrictive covenants to avoid unenforceable noncompete clauses and reduced competition.")
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interest of free competition and open markets created a kind of suspicion and
hostility towards non-compete agreements. Thus, the courts reviewed these
agreements under the auspices of the reasonableness test, judiciously making sure
that the interest being protected under the covenant and its scope were paramount
to protecting those interests. 4A majority of states tend to enforce non-compete
agreements with two extremes outliers.
II.

THE PROS AND CONS OF NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS

Examining and understanding the rational for the use of non-competes
agreements from the Employer and Employees perspectives is quintessential in the
policy rational behind regulations and court's decision. In the same vein, looking
at the rational against the use and enforcement of these agreements, would give a
fuller and better appreciation to both sides of the debate. The Pros and Cons for
and against upholding Non-Compete Agreements include, as Buliga and Fitzgerald
explain in their article:
[b]y definition, non-compete agreements block the formation of
new businesses that may compete with their employers. Companies
that utilize non-compete agreements are looking to keep
themselves on top by controlling potential entrepreneurs and
squashing any innovation before it begins. Doing this perpetuates
a marketplace bureaucracy that protects established, larger
businesses and deters entrepreneurs from introducing and
implementing revolutionary new ideas."
On the other hand, competition is key to innovations, quality of products
and new opportunities, and non-compete clauses tend to restrict mobility, and
stops people from creating new businesses." It is important that new firms enter
the market to contribute to economic dynamism and speeds improvements in
welfare." Jackson and Weins also state "innovation is more likely to occur in a
competitive market where opportunities and resources for developing new
products are up for grabs.""
This leads us to the rise of litigation over non-compete clauses over the
decades. Many employers may not realize the effect this has on entrepreneurship,
including that non-compete agreements prevent innovation. Those non-compete
agreements prevent people from leaving corporations and starting their own

1

54

Garrison & Wendt, supra note 22, at 122.

Id.

55

Bianca Buliga &Jenna Fitzgerald, SteppingOur Game Up: America'sPathTo Innovation, SEED SPOT (July
28, 2016) https://seedspot.org/stepping-game-americas-path-innovation/.
56 Chris Jackson & Jason Weins, A Fair Fight and Competition Policy, REAL CLEAR POLICY,
https://www.realclearpolicy.com/public affairs/2018/10/11/a fair fight entrepreneurship and corn
petition policy 110844.html (last visited April 12, 2019).
57 Id.
58 Id.
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businesses or even hire workers." Simon and Angus used the example of a man
named Rami Essaid who started a program that protects websites from
attackers.6 0 Soon after he started the company, his former employer sued him and
he spent six months negotiating a settlement.6' Rami commented that noncompete clauses limit your ability to grow and tap your own network.6 2
Another con lies in that non-compete clauses effect startup companies
because it hinders these companies from hiring new prospective employees. 6 John
Hirschtick, the founder of a startup technology business says that it is hard to hire
new software engineers because non-compete clauses restrict them from working
with competitors. 4 Professor Alan Hyde, a professor of Rutgers University School
of law stated that non-compete clauses have little social or economic advantage,
"You have slower growth, fewer startups, fewer patents and loss of brains to
jurisdictions that don't enforce the agreement."" However, a recent study revealed
that states that strictly enforce non-competes agreements have fewer employees
leave their current jobs to start new businesses in the same field. The study also
found that in these same states, businesses of poor quality are weeded out, and the
spins outs that are founded are larger and better performing.66
Others argue that non-compete clauses help innovations and economic
development to flourish as theses clauses protect entrepreneur's ideas,
investments, good will, and other legitimate business interests.6 7 This assertion is
often buttressed by the use as an example to critics of non-compete clauses to
show that where non-compete clauses are nonexistent, companies tend to thrive. 68
Hence, the argument goes that the reason Silicon Valley is so successful is that the
companies there are hard to replicate.69 Non-compete clauses do not make it
impossible to find jobs per se, as in most states it can "only reasonably limit
competition by narrowly tailoring duration, geography, and scope restriction, and
it also must protect the legitimate business interest of the party seeking
enforcement." 0
Ruth Simon & Angus Loten, Litigation Over Noncompete Clauses is Rising, WALL ST. J. (Aug, 15 2013,
8:06
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/litigation-over-noncompete-clauses-is-rising-doesentrepreneurship-suffer-1376520622.
60
59

Id.

61

1CL

62

Id. at 2.
at 3.

6Id.
64

d.
d.
66 Chad Brooks, Arc Non-Competes Badfor Entrepreneurship?,BUSINESS NEWS DAILY (July 31 2016, 3:37
PM), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/9285-non-compete-effect-entrepreneurship.html.
67 Philip C. Korovesis, Bernard Fuhs & Marc Oswald, Why Noncompete critics are Singing the Wrong Song,
BUTZEL LONG, 41 (Mar. 2012), https://www.butzel.com/media/publication/382 03.12.2012/o200
/20Article 0/20Noncompete.pdf.
65

68
69

Id. at 42.
Id.

70

Id. at 43. Critics of non-compete in Massachusetts point to the case of Zona Corp. v. McKinnon,
2011 Mass. Super., 28 MASS. L. REP. 233 (2011); as the prime example of why those clauses should be
banned.; Secalso Philip C. Korovesis, Bernard Fuhs & Marc Oswald, Why Noncompete critics arcSinging
the
Wrong
Song,
BUTZEL
LONG,
41
(Mar.
2012),
https://www.butzel.com/media/publication/382 03.12.2012/620-
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Another perspective that defends non-compete clauses lies in that, without
them, entrepreneurs have no incentive to invest in an new idea and train
employees, if those new employees are able to take what they have learned and
move across the street and start competing with the company.' The argument goes
that innovation and business developments take large amounts of time, money and
trial and error, therefore without the adequate protection, other businesses who
are not in the same financial position would be able to steal ideas.72 Noncompete
clauses create the incentive to innovate and protect entrepreneurs and their ideas,
thus banning non-compete clauses would remove that incentive.73
Others who oppose employee restrictions using non-competes contend
that these agreements tend to promote innovation and reinforce the economic
growth, as firms would be likely to invest in research and design.74 In addition, in
so doing, the company is not really concerned that their potential competitors will
"poach knowledgeable employees or that the employees would leave them to start
their own directly competing business."75 On the other hand, this very assertion is
opposed by research that demonstrates that the enforcement of non-competes to
the contrary, is attended by lessened expenditure on research and design. 76 In the
same vein, other research also shows that upon signing a non-compete, an
employee has no incentive to develop new ideas for a current employer as the
employee is very aware that he will not make any gains from the new idea, or even
when he starts a new business upon the new idea.7
Once again opposing non-compete agreements, some argue that spillover is
important for competition and innovation and with the restrictions on mobility
placed on employees with non-compete clauses, intel cannot be passed from one
company to the next easily.78 Entrepreneurs, who wish to have a startup firm,
usually spin it off the previous work they were doing.79 The owners of the startups
face setbacks with not being able to get their companies off the ground because
they are not able to hire the right employees for the jobs, who have been bounded
0

/20Article 0/20Noncompete.pdf. This case is a good example of how a reasonable tailored noncompete clause protects a legitimate business. Id. In this case Zona Corporation hired a recent
graduate of cosmetology school and required that he sign a non-compete agreement. The clause
prohibited Zora from competing against the seven-town area, for a period of one year after he
stopped working that employer. Id. at 43. On the other hand, the employer argued that this noncompete did not restrict him from earning a livelihood as the employee would be able to work
outside of the seven-town area. Id.
71 Philip C. Korovesis, Bernard Fuhs & Marc Oswald, Why Noncompete critics are Singing the Wrong Song,
BUTZEL LONG, 43 (Mar. 2012), https://www.butzel.com/media/publication/382 03.12.2012/o200
/20Article 0/20Noncompete.pdf.
72
73

Id.
Id. at 44.

Abigail S Nicandri, The Growing Disfavor of Non-CompetcAgreements in thcNew Economy and Alternative
Approaches for Protecting Employer's ProprietaryInformation and trade Secrets, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 1003,
(2011).
71 Id. at 1013.
76 Id.
77 Id.; See also Mark A. Lemley & James H.A. Pooley, CaliforniaRestrictive Employment Covenants after
7

Edwards, 23 CAL. LAB. & EMP. L. REV. 1, (2013), https://papers.ssn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=1295606.

78 Sampsa & Olave, supra note 4, at 428.
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from non competes from their previous employers. 0 Research shows that in areas
that do not enforce non-competes clauses or rarely enforce them, there is a higher
number of patents and entrepreneurship. The higher the level of entrepreneurship
had a correlation with high levels of mobility."
Regarding the contract itself, a fact that opposes non-compete agreements
lies in that there is not much of any negotiations of these non-compete contracts,
given that virtually anyone asked to sign does so.8 2 One in 10 people request for a
lawyer's review of the employment contract. Seventy percent of workers with none
compete clauses were only asked to sign after they have received their job offers,
and with forty percent, asked to sign after the first day of work." Not
unsurprisingly, where workers happen to have been given the non-compete
agreement in advance of the job offer being accepted, they may not necessarily be
conversant with the fact that there is a non-compete clause in the contract, and let
alone its content.84
The argument also goes that non-competes could be advantageous to both
the employer and the employee. That is, where the employee is prohibited from
working for a competitor, it protects not only employer's trade secrets, but also
could also be advantageous to the employee. 85 For example, in the area of sports, it
is said that professional athletes would benefit from a "fixed term contract" instead
of hoping from one team to another. This would result in a "lower worker turnover"
which invariably may result in the employer's readiness to invest even more in the
employees through training. 86
The final point focuses on a jurisdictions' enforcement of the non-compete
agreements. Mark Garmaise of the University of California, Los Angeles, found
that the more stringently a state allows enforcement of non-compete agreements,
the longer executives stay at the companies, the less they are paid, and the greater
the use of salary compensation over alternatives such as stock options. This, due
to the enforcement, may lead to a reduction of human capital self-investment by

80

Id at 428.

81
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Id. at 3. Matthew Marx, a professor at the Sloan School of Management at M.I.T. found that
employees are typically presented with non-compete clauses when their bargaining power is at its
lowest, on the day they star working. The enforcement of non-compete agreements vary from state
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(June
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high-ranking employees. According to Garmaise, this is because the executive's
self-investments were more important than the companies' investments in them.'7
III.

SOME JURISDICTIONAL EXAMPLES OF HANDLING NON-COMPETE
AGREEMENTS

A. THE OHIO MODEL AND APPROACH

Ohio's Supreme Court decides non-compete litigation on a case-by-case
basis.88 The Supreme Court used the blue pencil test prior to 1975.89 Under this
blue pencil test, it allows the court to remove certain parts of the non-compete
clause, but did not allow the court to alter or modify the clause.9 0 That is the blue
pencil rule empowers the court to "sever portions of an overbroad non-compete
agreement." 9' After 1975, the Ohio court began using the reasonableness standard
test. 92 The reasonable standard test was adopted in the case of Raimonde v. Van
Verah,93 where the appellant and appellee were both veterinarians in a small town.
Appellee was working for appellant and signed a covenant not to compete within
30 miles of appellant, and for a period of three years. Upon termination of his
employment, appellee started his own practice less than 30 miles from
appellants.9 4 Appellant sued appellee based on the covenant, but the suit was
dismissed because the covenant was in unreasonable restraint of trade. The court
in so holding abandoned the "blue pencil" approach of striking out unreasonable
provisions in favor of the reasonableness approach.95 The court wanted a more
consistent standard to apply to non-compete litigation.9 In its opinion, the court
laid out two tests to be employed in considering reasonableness of the noncompete.9 7 The first was a three prong balancing test, while the second was
reasonableness factors to be considered in light of the circumstances of the case. 98
The three prongs to be considered are: 9 9 (1) the covenant is no greater than is
required for the protection of the employer; (2) does not impose undue hardship
on the employee, and; (3) does not cause injury to the public.1 00 The second other
factors the court indicates should be considered in the balance in the Raimonde

87 David Price, Does Enforcement of Employee Noncompete Agreements Impede the development of Industry
Cluster?
FEDERAL
RESERVE
BANK
RICHMOND,
5
(Nov.
2014),
https://www.richmondfed.org//media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/economic brief/201
4/pdf/eb 14-11.pdf.
88 Buente, supra note 18, at 81.
89
fI
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cL
91 Garrison & Wendt, supra note 22, at 124.
92 Buente, supra note 18, at 83.
93 Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, (1975).
94 Id.
95 Buente, supra note 18, at 83.
96 Id. The court's ruling does not seem to leave any consistency among the trial courts.
97
d.
98
d
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case include: (1) whether the employee represents sole contact with clients; (2) is
the employee in possession of with confidential information or trade secrets; (3)
does the non-compete clause eliminate unfair competition, or ordinary
competition; (4) does the non-compete clause impede skill and experience of the
employer; (5) the benefit of the employer and the detriment to the employee; (6)
does the non-compete clause impedes the employees ability to seek a livelihood;
(7) if the talent the employer want to restrict was gained during employment, and;
(8) if the forbidden employment is merely incidental to the main employment.101
Courts in Ohio are more likely to uphold non-compete clauses when the
former employee is trying to start their own business, as seen in the case of Copece
Inc. v. Caley.102 In this case, where a former employee who had worked a copy
business and left his employer to start his own copy business with a partner, the
court reasoned that the non-compete clause was reasonable because the former
employee gained knowledge and industry experience by his former employers.
This is even more so given that the non-compete prohibited the former employee
from started a similar business in a forty-five miles radius. 0
The lower Courts in Ohio seem to be struggling with the application of the
reasonable standard stipulated in Raimonde, and therefore no consistent
application resulting to confusion among the lower courts.

04

Some Ohio courts

only apply the reasonableness test under the three prong and proceed to use the
said factors above as illustrative authority. On the other hand, other courts tend to
give equal weight to both the three-prong test and the added factors. 0
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not actually clarified or given directions
thereby only leaving the confusion entrenched for businesses and trial attorneys. 0
The Raimonde court's decision and approach regarding post-employment
restrictions was reaffirmed in Rogers v. Runfola d& Associates, Inc..'0 7 In this case,
Rogers and a coworker worked with Runfola, a business company providing court
reporting services, and signed a covenant not to compete with Runfola. 0 After
working for the company for ten years, they each sent to employer a letter of
resignation and proceeded to start their own reporting company.0 9 However, they
did so in contravention of the non-compete with Runfola prohibiting them from
providing court-reporting services in Franklin County for two years.11 0 The
agreement also had anti solicitation and anti-piracy clauses but with no time limit.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the non-compete agreements were
unreasonable and excessive, and went on to deal with the issue of "whether some
restrictions prohibiting appellees from competing were necessary to protect

101 Buente, supra note 18, at 84-85.
102 Buente, supra note 18 at 89; Copeco, Inc. v. Caley, 632 N.E. 2d 1299 (Ohio CT App. 1992).
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Runfola's business interests." The court modified the scope of the covenant but
safeguarded employer's business interests, taking into consideration its
investment in human capital." 2 That is, the agreement was enforced for a period of
one year, as well as also prohibit solicitation and competition of Runfola's
customers within Columbus."' In so deciding, the Court found that the Runfola
Company had a "legitimate business justification for the non-compete agreement
in the general training it provided the court reporters."" 4
B. THE CALIFORNIA MODEL AND APPROACH

As stated in the introduction, California is a forefront state well known for
outlawing non competes in employment contracts, as these clauses for the most
part are generally considered void." Under section 16600 of the Professional
Business and Professions Code, with limited exceptions, "every contract by which
anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any
kind is to that extent void."" 6 California often said to be the most hostile state to
non-competes." However, where the non-compete is necessary to protect trade
secrets for example, the non-compete may not be considered invalid. Based on
court decisions, California law appears to allow for non-compete in very limited
three circumstances, where those agreements are in connection with: (1) the sale
of business; (2) dissolution of a partnership, and; (3) termination of a member's
business interest in a limited liability company."8 California court decisions
buttress a legislative policy under Section 16600 in favor of completion and
employee mobility."' In so doing, indicating the legislature espouses a
predetermined outcome that the balancing of employer/employee interests in these
non-competes clause will more or less tend to be in favor of the employee.1 2 0 It has
been stated that the California policy regarding non-compete statute is not rooted
in the desire to encourage employee mobility as much as it is rooted in seeking
employee autonomy.' 2' The state's court repeat this same sentiment in the public
policy of section 16600. It states that California has "a strong public policy against
11
112

Id. at 544.; See also Buente, supra note 18, at 89-90.
Id.

1 Id.

Id.; See also Garrison & Wendt, supra note 22 (stating that Runfola played a huge role in the
employees' development as successful court reporters. Thus, these employees obtained valuable
insights in the business, "much of the training and support undoubtedly inured to the benefit of the
employees.").
u1 See D'Sa v. Playhut, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 4th 927, 933 (2005) (Stating that California automatically
voids all blanket non-compete agreements).
114
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noncompetition agreements under section 16600" given that that policy "protects
Californians, and ensures that "every citizen shall retain the right to pursue any
lawful employment and enterprise of their choice," and also protects "the legal
right of persons to engage in businesses and occupation of their choosing."' 2 2
Likewise in California, any employee use of a non-compete falling outside
the three stated exceptions, (otherwise known as illegal non-competes), is said to
be in violation of the state's completion laws.' 23 An employer who is in violation
does not only encounters the court's denial to enforce the agreement, but may also
be subject to penalties for seeking to enforce a broad non-compete clause.12 4
Consequently and as indicated in some recent cases, it is only fair to conclude that
covenants not to compete in California are void as matter of law, unless they are
covered under the statutory exceptions provided to section 16600.125
For example, in the 2008 case of Edwards v. Arthur Andersen,'126 where the
employee plaintiff challenged the non-compete agreement he had signed with his
employer at the time he was hired in 1997. In finding that the non-compete clause
was unenforceable, the Supreme Court considered the "narrow restraint"
exception, which some federal courts had embraced in their decisions.1 27 These
federal courts held that non-compete agreements, which lead to only a partial or
narrow restraints on the employee's ability to work in his profession were
reasonable and enforceable.1 28The Supreme Court rejected this section 16600
purported exception, stating that the public policy behind said section did not
allow for such a restraint, regardless of limitation.1 29 Therefore, this case makes
clear as well as reaffirms the longstanding public policy behind section 16600 and
unmistakably rejects non-compete clauses that are crafted in a way to conform to
the narrow restraint exception.3 0
Likewise, section 16600 cannot be avoided by choice of law provision in the
employment contract, for example, by claiming or select the law of another state
to govern the agreement and so do away with the provisions of the California
Id
Nicandri, supranote 75 at 1009.
124 Id
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exception extend to trade secrets, that is whether as a narrow exception, employers can use a
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Retirement Group v. Galante, 176, Cal. App. 4th 1226 (Ct. App. 2009) dealt with the issue and held
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preventing a former employee from making use of a former employee's customer list for purposes of
soliciting business was recognized and enforced in Gordan V. Landou 321 F.2d 456 ( 9th Cir.1958).
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section."1 The strict application against the choice of law provision to avoid the
California rule even if inadvertently is demonstrated by the case of Application Group
Inc. v. HunterGroup Inc.' 32 The Court of Appeals in California refused to validate and
enforce an out of state non-compete agreement signed by an employee who
accepted a new job in California.' That is the court in California invalidated a
non-compete agreement, which is otherwise valid in the state in which it is made,
but the employee was to move to California to take up the new job. The issue was
whether California law may be applied to determine the enforceability of a
covenant not to compete in an employment contract between an employee who is
not a resident of California and an employer whose business is based in the
outskirts of California, when a California based employer seeks to hire the
nonresident for employment in California. The court in reinforcing its public
policy rationale of ensuring every citizen retain the right to pursue any lawful
employment of their choice, stated that there is no evidence that Pike attempted
to exploit Hunter's trade secrets or other protected information about its
customers.134

In essence, California does not enforce choice of law provisions, in the case
of non-compete clauses, meaning that as long as the employee is working in
California, the non-compete clause will not be enforced. 35 Even companies that
are based in California and hire workers outside of the state are not allowed noncompete clauses in their employee contracts.' 6 Therefore, California helps trade
and competition within its borders with not only a policy that values human
capital and its mobility but also the readiness to provide a safe haven to employees
who have signed non-compete elsewhere. 37
C.

MODERN APPROACHES TO ENFORCEMENT OF NON-COMPETES IN AN EVOLVING
MARKET

Traditionally, non-compete agreements were quite protective of the
employer by maintaining and protecting free competition and employee's mobility
131
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Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 61 Cal. App. 4th 881 ( Ct. App. 1998). Application Group
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and other California based software companies are Hunter's immediate competitors. The Hunter
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employees did sign them. AGI, supra at 886. AGI is a California corporation that provides
customers computer consultant. Pike was an employee of Hunter for 16 months. supra at 887. Pike
never had any business contact in California but was sued when she resigned from Hunter to go
work for AGI Id Hunter's non-compete stated: "for a period of one year after the date of its
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or consulting nature, whether as an employee or otherwise, to any business which is a competitor
of Hunter.
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for the interest of society.' 8 Regardless of whether one is using the common law
reasonableness standard or the restraint of trade statutes, employers were
expected to meet the threshold standard that would defend the employee noncompete agreement."' Overtime, less demanding approaches to non-compete
agreements has been employed with states adjusting to less stringent standards.1 40
States have statutes that relaxed the old common law strict rules and accepting of
non-compete agreements that would otherwise be unreasonable and unacceptable
under the customary common law rules.141 This approach often referred to as the

modern approach, is more in favor to the interests of the worker and less in favor
of the interests of the employer's interest, especially regarding mobility.1 42 The
courts have done so for example, by widening the permissible scope of employee
non-compete agreements by relaxing the common law reasonable standard. Thus,
it is not unusual to find some courts acceptable of restrictive covenants of up to
five years. 43 In this new approach, courts have accepted non-competes covenants
that goes beyond contacts with whom the employee may have had contacts
with.1 44 In this same vein, non-compete covenants that were seen as simply
designed to prevent the employee from working even for a business not in
competition with the previous employer are not enforceable. 45
In the state of Ohio, the initial strict adherence to the common law
reasonable standards have been relaxed as seen in the cases of Raimondev. Van Vierah,
a case which started with a permissive method to worker's non-compete
agreements, by departing from the blue pencil rule and embracing court
modification of non competes, is itself a modern approach.1 46 In the same vein, the
outcome of the Runfola case discussed above, in that the court enforced the noncompete agreement for one year, while barring competition and solicitation.
Therefore, in so doing, the court is saying that it finds "a legitimate business
justification for the non-compete agreements in the general training provided for
the court reporters." However, under the common law reasonable standard, this
sort of generalized skill and training would not pass muster, as it would not have
been considered enough to meet the after employment restraint.14 7 Consequently,
Runfola would appear to enlarge the business interests that employers can seek to
protect under non-compete agreements.' 48 The joint effect of these two cases are
said to liberalize the law of non-compete in employment in Ohio1 49 and, therefore,
a modern trend.

13s. Garrison & Wendt, supra, at 122.
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In the field of employee education and training, courts tend to be protective
of the employer who has spent time and money on employee education and
training that are extraordinary or deals with specialized training thereby giving
that employee enhanced and sophistication in his current skill. It therefore seems
unfair for that employer to allow that employee to use those improved skills to
benefit a competitor, more so after contracting not to do so.1 0 The state of
Colorado has dealt with the issue of employer's interest in employees training
expenses statutorily. The law allows for the employer to recover expense of
educating and training the employee who has worked for the employer for less than
two years.' 5 'However, this law has not deterred some courts from employing an
expansive employer interest by extending to generalized training as well as to
employees who have not shown to specialize or acquire unique skills.' 52
Consequently, it is a departure from the common law standard to recognize
employer investment in a generalized employee training as legitimate interests."'
Another evolving trend already mentioned briefly above, is the movement
by many states from the blue pencil doctrine to reformation, which simply means
the court is empowered to change or modify over broad non-compete agreements
in order to make them enforceable as reformed.54 The reformation approach has
been applauded by some scholars because it gives the courts the discretion to write
the non-compete agreement in a reasonable manner reflective of the parties'
general intent."' In following this approach, the courts are mindful of employer
overreaching. Reformation where employers have intentionally drafted
unreasonable or overbroad non-compete provisions with the expectation that the
court would reform such a provision without any penalty against the employer is
often met with the good faith requirement scrutiny before reformation and
enforcement is upheld.' 56 Consequently, if a court finds the employer acted in bad
faith or deliberately drafted an overbroad non-compete, the court may refuse to
reform and enforce the agreement.15 7 A court may also refuse to reform the
agreement if it finds the covenant "so lacking in essential terms which would
protect the employee" such that the court is no longer modifying but rewriting the

150 Garrison & Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agreements, supra, at 128, citing
Hapney v. Cent. GarageInc., 579 SO. 2d. 127, 132 (Fla. App. 1991).
11 Garrison & Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agreements, supra, at 129; see
also Rev. Stat. Ann. S 8-2-113 (2) C (West 2003).
152
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153 Id The case of Borg-Warner Protective Services, Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F.Supp. 495 (E.
D. Ky. 1996). Where the court enforced a non-compete agreement relating to security guards.
Another rival company employed these security guards. The court in upholding the covenant stated
that the former employer of the security guards had a legitimate interest in the two week, on the
job training and education in the "culture of the client's firm and clients own security personnel."
Id.
154 Garrison & Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agreements, supra, at 130.
155 Id.
156 Michael Garrison & John Wendt, Employee Non-competes and Consideration: A Proposed
Good Faith Standard for the "Afterthought" Agreement, 64 U. Kan. L. Rev. 409, 456 (2015).
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covenant."' The good faith standard used in evaluating whether to reform an
agreement is exemplified in the case of MerrimackValley Wood Products, Inc. v. Near.'59
A former employee and sales person was constrained under his non-compete clause
from selling to any client of his former employer for a period of one year of his
employment termination. The employee was never informed that he would sign a
non-compete agreement until six months into his employment when he was asked
to sign it and told his continued employment was contingent upon him signing the
agreement.16 0 Also, the agreement was considered overbroad given that out of the
employer's 1200 clients, the employee solicited only sixty of them.' 6 ' The court
refused the reformation of the covenant because the employer acted in bad faith
when he rather coerced the employee into signing the overbroad non-compete after
he was already working for him'6 2 . The court found bad faith in the manner in
which the employer obtained the overbroad non-compete agreement. 6 That is,
the employee really had no choice than to consent to signing the agreement at that
time.
In looking at the shifting trend and policy to non-compete agreements
today, one cannot undermine the changing employer/employment relationship
especially in light of the information age and the economy.16 4 As commented by
scholars and management, this relationship has shifted from the old-style longterm employment relationship characterized in the industrial age. In that
traditional long-term relationship, employee long-term commitment to the
employer and concomitantly, employee growth and advancement and job stability
somewhat of inherent in the relationship.'6 5 This was a business relationship that
was sustainable as it not only promoted long term business planning but also
businesses were encouraged to invest in their employees in training.' 66 As such,
there was inherent in this relationship an "implied quid pro quo, with employers
guaranteeing employment and the potential for advancement within the firm in
exchange for employee loyalty and commitment."'6 7 This established relationship
referred to by Garrison and Wendt as a "psychological contract", which is mutually
beneficial to both employee and employer.' 68 The employer was going to be
promoted and enjoy career growth, as employee is loyal to the employer. In the
same vein, the employer reaps the fruits of employee labor through enhanced
productivity, profits, and business growth.16 9

Garrison & Wendt, Employee Non-competes and Consideration, supra note 155, at 458-59.
Merrimack Valley Wood Products,Inc. v. Near, 876 A.2d 757 (2005). See also the case of Freiburgerv.JU-B Engineers, Inc. 111 P.3d 100 (Idaho 2005).
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On the other hand, in the contemporary employment relationship, external
market forces are said to substitute the internal labor force of the industrial age as
it is instead characterized by "employee mobility, lack of job security and limited
70 As a result, the employer in this
loyalty by either employees or employers."o

environment would want to survive by being very competitive, and this
competitiveness is sometimes not only in their local markets but also may be
impacted by global trends.171 Thus, such an employer would want to remain
competitive by being astute and flexible in responding to rapid changes, strategies
and plans. Thus, where profitability is less than optimal for example, the employer
is invariable faced with cost cutting measures which may include layoffs resulting
to employees' job insecurity as a trend.
This contemporary relationship is fraught with uncertainty and flexibility
than was the case in the industrial tradition.1 72 Under this relationship, the
psychological contract demonstrates this new practicality of the work
environment. 73 Therefore under this atmosphere, and the "new implicit quid pro
quo, employers do not make a long term commitment and employment and job
security in exchange for the loyalty of the employee." 7 4 The employer if at all makes
any implied promise, it is that the employee would become more competitive in
the market because of acquiring skills and experiences from being employed. 75
Thus "employability, not employment is what the employer implicitly offers in
exchange for the employee's efforts and productivity."1 76 Based on this new
relationship, one could strongly argue in favor of the employee to have and be
allowed "broad rights to acquire retain and deploy their human capital" per the
new psychological contract, where employability and not employment is the offer
by the employer.' 77 The logical conclusion would therefore be that non-compete
agreements would no longer be necessary under this new psychological contract.1 78
That is, because of employee mobility in this new contractual relationship, noncompete agreements appear to be cumbersome, if employees are not allowed to
take along to their new employers, the acquired skills.179
D. LAW AND ECONOMY APPROACH TO NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS

From a macroeconomic perspective, post non-compete agreements were
heralded as necessary and essential to protect the employer's investment in the
170 Garrison & Wendt, supranote 22, at 166.
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However, as discussed under the pro and cons of non-compete above, it has been argued that
employee non-compete agreements is relevant to protect employer's investment in employees.
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employee as well as the company's knowledge or trade secrets.1 0 That by guarding
trade secrets through these agreements, research and development was
encouraged and thus innovation.18 1 And, since these agreements also invariably
prevent unfair competition, they are important for the adequate running of an
efficient market.' 8 2 These assumptions have been questioned by scholars, many of
whom believes that the employee needs more legal protections for its human
capital than as it exists under the common law."'
Economists and scholars instead stipulated that innovation and
entrepreneurial activities increase where there are laws in place restricting
employee non-competes. In addition, the success of the IT companies in Silicon
Valley, California is often tooted as an example and model to be followed. The
success has been largely credited to the high employee mobility, which also results
in information sharing, which in turn ushered in new capital ventures in the area. 84
Professor Ronald Gilson, a prominent scholar in this field stated in his article that:
Silicon Valley's legal infrastructure, in the form of Business and Professional Code's
16600's prohibition of covenants not to compete, provided a pole around which
Silicon's characteristics business culture and structure precipitated.""
Although non-competes have been challenged recently in a number of
states, with some states actually introducing legislation to limit its applicability,1 86
the policy debate in some states is still prevalent. Massachusetts for example, in
emulating California IT sector, passed legislation that renders non-compete
agreements void and unenforceable.1 87 The question is: Why do we not hear of
Massachusetts's prominence in the same way we hear of Silicon Valley's? Professor
Ronald Gilson in comparing the two High tech economies of Massachusetts' Route
128 and Silicon Valley, posited that the difference in the enforcement of the noncompete agreements in the two regions accounts for the distinct elevation of
Silicon Valley.18 8 That is, Gilson posits, the animosity in the state towards noncompetes agreements because of the culture of free mobility resulted in an
entrenched economic growth'89 . Professor Gilson also claims that the states
approach to enforcement may also be an attributable factor in the difference, as
Massachusetts follows the common law reasonable standard approach, which
allows for enforcement under certain situations, while California out rightly bans
almost all non-competes agreements9 o. To the extent that this is indeed outcome
determinative, then there is some supportable argument to be made that limiting
1so Garrison &Wendt, supra note 22, at 418.
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these non-compete employment agreements may actually foster growth and
technological innovations.191 A 2004 empirical study in Silicon Valley and other
places seems to confirm Gilson's conclusion, as the study revealed evidence that
Silicon Valley employees in the information technology were shown to have higher
rates of finding other jobs than those employees from other cities. 192 Scholars who
criticized Professor Gilson included Prescott, Bishara, and Starr, 93 arguing that his
explanation for the difference between the two states "relied on the perception
that high tech workers in Silicon Valley were more mobile was theoretical but
intuitively attractive."194

Another law and economic approach on analyzing non-competes clauses
posits that non-competes enforcement results in wages staying down and
executive stability. 95 Nevertheless, as much as human capital investment in
managers is promoted in this atmosphere, the downside is that self-investment in
human capital by the employee is undermined, especially given that employees are
not going to invest in their own human capital because of the non-compete
agreements.' 96
E. TRADE SECRETS AND NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS

Although there is nothing improper per se with employers protecting
business trade secrets by using employee covenant not to compete, courts tend to
be hesitant to enforce the agreement, where the employee does not appear to have
access to trade secrets or confidential information.' 97 The reluctance of the court
to do so is to avoid unlawful restraint of trade. 98 However, even where the
employer has entered into a non-compete agreement to protect trade secrets or
prevent the former employee from disclosure of such secrets and/ or limit the
employee's desire to open a competing business or start one himself, this
protection is only prophylactic at best.199 This is so because this non-compete
agreement is likely insufficient to protect the former employer, even where there is
an added protection under state statutes and the Uniform Trade Secret Act
("UTSA"), which makes available injunctive relief for actual or threatened
misappropriation of trade secrets.2 00 That is, by the time the former employer
invokes the tenets of the non-compete or get injunctive relief under state law or
the UTSA as applicable, it may be too late, as the misappropriation of the
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information may have already taken place and possibly the ensuing damage.2 01
Scholars have argued that the use of such non-compete agreements as a tool for the
prevention and misappropriation of trade secrets is not effective.2 02
This employee misappropriation of trade secrets or confidential
information by a former employee often referred to as the inevitable disclosure
doctrine defined as the "legal theory that a key employee, once hired by a
competitor, cannot avoid misappropriating the former employer's trade secrets."2 03
Based on this doctrine, a court can prevent by injunction, "a former employee from
working for a competitor of the employer to prevent an imminent threat of trade
secret misappropriation."2 04 Under this doctrine, there does not have to be an
employee non-compete agreement, or an actual misappropriation of trade secret
for the doctrine to kick in.205 A court would usually invoke the doctrine where an
employee is in possession of technical "specialized and highly valuable trade
secrets" and the court want to stop a competitor from unlawfully securing that
protected and valuable knowledge by hiring that employee.2 06 Under the common
law, the doctrine, which was in existence prior to the UTSA and was developed in
a number of cases,2 07 was more restrictive, and intended to simply prevent
"imminent threat of a trade secret disclosure" which was disastrous for unfair
competition.208
However, in the case of PepsiCo2 09 the Seventh Circuit expanded the
common law standard as it developed a new form of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine under the UTSA. 210 In it, the court changes the focus and the elements of
the doctrine in this case. 211 The case rises in the context of the soda wars of the
Id. (The reason for stating that some employers use these non-competes as a prophylactic
because the former employer is using it as an extra protection against the misappropriation of its
business trade secrets in the first place and then having to respond to the harm caused thereafter.)
202 Id. at 10 - 11 (stating that when used as a prophylactic tends to be generally overbroad and not
measured to only the trade secret in disclosure in question; that such non-competes entails the risk
of over deterrence; the non-compete could be overbroad with the employer anticipating a
reformation or modification, which invariably means the non-compete will not be invalidated).
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nineties, which resulted in two forefront companies. Quaker Oats being popularly
known for its Gatorade brand along with the Snapple fruit drink, while PepsiCo,
a competitor and rival also joined the market with its all sports brand in 1994. 212
In order to increase its market share, PepsiCo went into a joint venture with Ocean
Spray Cranberry and Thomas Lipton company in 1995. Mr. William Redmond who
worked for PepsiCo as a high-level executive apparently accepted a similar
position in Quaker Oats.213 Because Redmond had taken part in planning and
orchestrating PepsiCo's marketing and strategies for 1995, the likes of which
involved "sensitive information on pricing and attack plans for specific markets,"
PepsiCo brought suit against Redmond and Quaker Oats. The law suit claimed an
imminent threat of trade secret misappropriation.2 14 The district court prohibited
Redmond from taking up the position with Quaker Oats for six months, which
was a noncompete period essential to protect PepsiCo's trade secret and strategic
plan for 1995.215 The court upon a review of the Illinois Trade Secret Act and case
law stated that "a plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by
demonstrating that the defendant's new employment will inevitably lead him to
rely on the plaintiffs trade secrets."216 Although many courts have embraced the
inevitable disclosure doctrine as in PepsiCo, they have done so in different ways,
yet the doctrine remains the majority rule with courts using for the most part the
rules of the inevitable disclosure doctrine and legal reasoning.217
CONCLUSION

This article has shown the complexities of the laws on non-compete
agreements and how there is no one size fits all solution. The law varies from state
to state, with only a handful of the states completely prohibiting non-compete
agreements between the employer and employee, and with California being the
most prominent of these few states.218 However, all states agree that there should
be protection of a business interest like trade secrets, confidential information but
the states are not in unison as to what those interests should be.219
One of the main issues in these non-competes agreements revolves around
the control of human capital. Human capital 'refers to the acquired skills,
knowledge, and abilities of human beings.22 0 "Underlying the concept is the notion
that such skills and knowledge increase human productivity, and that they do so
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enough to justify the costs incurred in acquiring them. It is in this sense that
expenditures on improving human capabilities can be thought of as investment.'2 21
Thus, in legislating and enforcing these non-compete agreements, one must
strike the right balance between promoting investment in human capital, research
and development, and encouraging the productive use of the acquired
investment.2 22 The evolving contemporary employment relationship between the
employer and employee demonstrates how states and policy makers should
evaluate non-competes agreements and its effects; adapt to the changing landscape
of the labor market today in light of employee mobility.2 23 As stated previously, 224
"employability, not employment is what the employer implicitly offers in exchange
for the employee's efforts and productivity." 225 That is, because of employee
mobility in this new contractual relationship, non-compete agreements appear to
be cumbersome, if employees are not allowed to take along to their new employers,
the acquired skills. 226 This is even more precarious in an environment with

constantly evolving technology. It may be more difficult to determine a company's
geographic scope if for example, the business is one that operates and offer its
services on the internet, which may span into markets beyond its local physical
boundary. In the same vein, it could be difficult to access proper time limitation for
the scope of the non-competing agreement, regardless of the test that may be
employed. 227 New businesses and therefore entrepreneurship can mostly multiply
and thrive if such challenges are thoughtfully addressed by the courts, states and
policy makers.
However, "[o]ne thing is certain, that regardless on which side of the con
or pro debate one is on regarding non-competes, 'every company benefits from
being able to hire talented employees and enjoy other companies, knowledge
spillovers, but at the same time every company also wants to prevent its own
employees from leaving and taking their training and knowledge with them." 228
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